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of consideration is a matter of defense as against any person not
a holder in due course." 15
In the instant case, it was stated that, if the University had
failed to fulfill its contractual obligations, it might be liable in a
subsequent suit for damages. Denial of the defense of failure of
consideration, then, results in complete circuity of action and
additional court costs. In view of the express provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, the general contract principles em-
bodied in the Code,16 and the previous decisions in analagous
cases,'7 the holding of the court in the instant case seems unsound.
When, as in the present case, the action is brought by one who
is not a holder in due course, a more satisfactory result would be
reached by sustaining the defense of failure of consideration. In
this way, the entire controversy would be settled in a single
action, whether brought on the note or the contract, and justice
could be attained for the maker without violating any of the
provisions enacted for the protection of the sanctity and integrity
of negotiable instruments.
A.R.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WELL-SPACING LEGISLATIoN-Plaintiff,
the owner of six and one-quarter acres of a ten acre "drilling
unit," sought to recover the entire royalty from a producing well
located on his property. He contended that the Oklahoma "well-
spacing" act,' providing for a proportionate distribution of the
royalty among the owners of royalty interests in each "drilling
unit,"2 was unconstitutional as a violation of "due process" and
"separation of powers." Held, (1) the act is a reasonable exercise
of the police power; (2) the Corporations Commission, which
administers it, is excepted by the Oklahoma constitution itself
from the operation of the "separation of powers" clause. Patter-
15. Therefore, the failure of the payee of a note to fulfill the obligation
which constitutes the consideration for which it was given extinguishes the
obligation of the maker of the note to pay it. Bonnet-Brown Sales Service
v. The Bunkie Record, 3 La. App. 410 (1926); Parks v. Cilluffa, 7 La. App.
749 (1928); Hick's v. Levett, 19 La. App. 836, 140 So. 276 (1932); Stamn
Scheele, Inc. v. Loewer, 149 So. 908 (La. App. 1933).
16. See notes 6, 9 and 10, supra.
17. See notes 14 and 15, supra.
1. Okla. Laws 1935, c. 59, art. 1 [Okla. Stats. Ann. (1937) tit. 52, §§ 85-87].
2. Okla. Laws 1935, c. 59, art. 1, § 3 [Okla. Stats. Ann. (1937) tit. 52, §
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son v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P. (2d) 83
(1938).3
Many conservation acts have been attacked on the ground
that they violated the due process clause of the federal constitu-
tion and the doctrine of separation of powers. Most of them
have been upheld on the authority of Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana.4
In that case the United States Supreme Court held that protec-
tion of the natural resources of the state is a valid exercise of
the police power. The decision of the present case further makes
clear the fact that measures designed to protect the correlative
rights of unit owners are within the constitutional power of the
legislature.'
The often-unsuccessful argument that statutes granting quasi-
legislative powers to executive or administrative agencies vio-
late the doctrine of separation of powers was renewed in the
Schechter6 and Hot Oil7 cases; and the Supreme Court of the
United States for the first time held that there had been an un-
constitutional delegation of congressional power. It declared that
conformity to the vague requirements of a "legislative standard"
is not sufficient. It is necessary that the legislation have a
"definiteness of subject matter"' and all administrative orders
must be based on express "findings of fact."9 Since some provision
relative to separation of powers appears in most state constitu-
tions,10 the above stated requirements likely will be persuasive
in future attacks on legislation granting rule-making authority.
Louisiana jurisprudence has followed the general principles
regarding delegation of power. The legislature may not delegate
its power; 1 but, after prescribing a definite standard, it may
3. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States held that no sub-
stantial federal question had been raised, and the appeal was dismissed for
want of jurisdiction. Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376, 59
S. Ct. 259, 83 L. Ed. 314 (1939).
4. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729 (1900).
5. The principle of correlative rights was first announced in Ohio Oil
Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729 (1900). For correlative
rights in Louisiana see: Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La.
233, 82 So. 206 (1919); McCoy v. Arkansas Nat. Gas. Co., 184 La. 101, 165 So.
632 (1936).
6. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79
L. Ed. 1570 (1935).
7. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed.
446 (1935).
8. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837,
79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935).
9. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed.
446 (1935).
10. La. Const. of 1921, Art. II, §§ 1, 2.
11. A statute which purports to vest arbitrary discretion in a public
officer without prescribing a definite rule for his guidance is unconsitutional.
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delegate the authority to ascertain facts which invoke the opera-
tion of the law.12 Where it is impracticable to lay down a definite
or comprehensive standard, an exception to this principle has
been recognized. 18
No problem of separation of powers was presented in the
present case. The Corporations Commission of Oklahoma, which
administers the well-spacing act, is excepted by constitutional
provision from the separation of powers clause. 14 However, the
Louisiana act 15 is administered by an executive officer;18 and
should the validity of the legislation be contested, objections
based on the doctrine of separation of powers undoubtedly will
be raised. The Louisiana act empowers the Commissioner of Con-
servation to adopt rules fixing the spacing of wells. 17 The Com-
missioner is also authorized to allow or require pooling.18 The
act contains no detailed procedure upon which to base the spacing
of wells and fixes no maximum limits.19
The courts in other states apparently have felt that the neces-
sity for conservation outweighs the possibility of evils of mal-
administration. In upholding the validity of conservation laws,
the courts have stressed the impossibility of fixing a definite
standard of administration. 20 The concept of "definite standard,"
as employed by the courts, is flexible enough to permit upholding
the Louisiana act without an undue straining of terms.
J. M. S.
State v. Mahner, 43 La. Ann. 496, 9 So. 480 (1891); State v. Dubarry, 44 La.
Ann. 1117, 11 So. 718 (1892); State v. Kuntz, 47 La. Ann. 106, 16 So. 651 (1895);
New Orleans v. Palmisano, 146 La. 518, 83 So. 789 (1920); State v. Carter,
159 La. 121, 105 So. 247 (1925).
12. State v. Guidry, 142 La. 422, 76 So. 843 (1917); State v. Carson Carbon
Co., 162 La. 781, 111 So. 162 (1927); State v. Grace, 184 La. 443, 166 So. 133
(1936). Cf. State v. Billot, 154 La. 402, 97 So. 589 (1923).
13. See New Orleans v. Sanford, 137 La. 628, 645, 69 So. 35, 41 (1915).
14. The Corporation Commission is vested by Art. 9 of the Constitu-
tion of Oklahoma with executive, legislative and judicial powers. Extension
by the legislature of the field over which these powers can be exercised
is authorized by Art. 9, § 35. Russell v. Walker, 160 Okla. 145, 16 P. (2d) 114
(1932).
15. La. Act 225 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9482.1-9482.16].
16. La. Const. of 1921, Art. V, § 1, providing for the office of Commissioner
of Conservation.
17. La. Act 225 of 1936, § 6(3) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9482.6].
18. La. Act 225 of 1936, § 6(6) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9482.6].
19. The Oklahoma act (see note 1, supra) provides for comprehensive
fact finding and a maximum spacing of ten acres, except by agreement, in
which case the maximum is forty acres.
20. People v. Associated Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93, 294 Pac. 717 (1930); Brown
v. Humble Oil Ref. Co,, 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W. (2d) 935, 99 A.L.R. 1107 (1935).
As to definiteness of subject matter: Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior
Court, Los Angeles County, Calif., 284 U.S. 8, 52 S. Ct. 103, 76 L. Ed. 136, 78
A.L.R. 826 (1931); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Commission of Okla.,
286 U.S. 210, 52 S. Ct. 559, 76 L. Ed. 1062 (1932).
